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A B S T R A C T
The Social Ampliﬁcation of Risk Framework (SARF) is often used as a conceptual tool for studying diverse risk
perceptions associated with environmental hazards. While widely applied, it has been criticised for implying that
it is possible to deﬁne a benchmark ‘real’ risk that is determined by experts and around which public risk
perceptions can subsequently become ampliﬁed. It has been argued that this objectiﬁcation of risk is particularly
problematic when there are high levels of scientiﬁc uncertainty and a lack of expert consensus about the nature
of a risk and its impacts. In order to explore this further, this paper examines how ‘experts’ – deﬁned in this case
as scientists, policy makers, outbreak managers and key stakeholders – construct and assemble their under-
standing of the risks associated with two invasive tree pest and disease outbreaks in the UK, ash dieback and oak
processionary moth. Through semi-structured interviews with experts in each of the case study outbreaks, the
paper aims to better understand the nature of information sources drawn on to construct perceptions of tree
health risks, especially when uncertainty is prevalent. A key conclusion is that risk assessment is a socially-
mediated, relational and incremental process with experts drawing on a range of oﬃcial, anecdotal and ex-
periential sources of information, as well as reference to past events in order to assemble the risk case. Aligned
with this, experts make attributions about public concern, especially when the evidence base is incomplete and
there is a need to justify policy and management actions and safeguard reputation.
1. Introduction
In recent decades there has been a dramatic increase in new tree
pest and disease epidemics, a development closely linked to globaliza-
tion, trade in plant material and wood packaging and human-induced
climate change (Potter and Urquhart, 2017). The technical process of
identifying the risks associated with new and emerging tree and plant
pests – a Pest Risk Analysis (PRA) – is used to determine appropriate
phytosanitary measures and assess the likely biological, economic and
social impacts of the outbreak (FAO, 2013). However, these assess-
ments often have to deal with large degrees of uncertainty, particularly
when scientiﬁc evidence is lacking, inconclusive or emerges piecemeal
as outbreaks unfold (DEFRA, 2014; Barnett and Weyman, 2015). De-
veloping a PRA may involve extrapolating existing data from other
geographical locations where the pest is present and where the climatic
and ecological conditions may be quite diﬀerent. Further, the interac-
tion with broader issues such as global trade and climate change means
that ﬁnding solutions acceptable to all stakeholders is often problematic
and costly, presenting a challenge to decision-makers about how best to
address the issue when there is signiﬁcant divergence in the risk un-
derstandings of diﬀerent groups (Busby et al., 2009).
Understanding the underlying social and cultural processes that
help shape diﬀering, and sometimes conﬂicting, perceptions of en-
vironmental hazards have been the focus of much research on risk
perception. Much of this work concentrates on the reasons for, and
implications of, diﬀerences or discrepancies in the way experts and lay
publics perceive risk (Busby and Duckett, 2012). In such studies, the
Social Ampliﬁcation of Risk Framework (SARF) (Kasperson et al., 1988)
is often used as a point of reference to help explain how the risk per-
ceptions of lay publics can sometimes diverge from those of experts,
either intensifying or attenuating the risk in a process of ‘social am-
pliﬁcation’ (Lazo et al., 2000; Savadori et al., 2004; Sjöberg and Drottz-
Sjöberg, 1993; Kasperson, 2012). The implication is that lay public
perceptions of the risk are eﬀectively being judged against a ‘real’ or
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benchmark expert risk assessment (Merkelsen, 2011). There is an as-
sumption, grounded in early risk research, that expert perceptions of
risk are objectively based on technical risk estimates, in contrast to lay
perceptions which are more complex and reﬂect a number of qualita-
tive characteristics such as ‘dread’ or ‘familiarity’ (Slovic et al., 1979;
Fischhoﬀ et al., 1978; Sjöberg, 2002; Renn, 2004).
However, as Rowe and Wright (2001) concluded, there is very little
empirical evidence to support the assertion that experts judge risks any
diﬀerently from lay publics or that the resulting expert risk assessments
are more ‘objective’ in nature. Work by social scientists points to expert
risk perceptions being just as likely as lay publics to be socially con-
structed and mediated through social ﬁlters such as personal world-
views, biases, institutional aﬃliations and personal experience (see, for
instance, Sjöberg, 2002; Lynn, 1986). Likewise, cultural theorists argue
that objective processes of risk analysis are a misnomer, with experts
demonstrating bias in the information they draw on, despite attempts at
objectivity (Duckett et al., 2015; Wynne, 1996; Shortall, 2013). Douglas
(1992) concludes that quantitative risk analysis is, thus, inadequate,
particularly for complex and contested environmental hazards and
objectivity cannot be seen as an ‘escape route’ for risk policy. Further,
the notion of an objective expert evaluation of the ‘real’ risk is parti-
cularly problematic and empirically diﬃcult to validate where there are
high levels of scientiﬁc uncertainty and where there are contested
claims about the nature of the ‘real’ risk (Rayner, 1988; Busby et al.,
2009; Busby and Onggo, 2012; Pidgeon and Barnett, 2013). Alongside
this, the public and media may have legitimate concerns that go beyond
technical risk assessments of probability and magnitude of harm
(Merkelsen, 2011; Pidgeon and Barnett, 2013).
Thus, despite inclusion of feedback loops in SARF, the perceived
linearity of its sender-message-receiver model has been criticised as
leading to a simpliﬁed characterisation of a complex set of relationships
that fails to fully recognise that experts as well as lay publics are social
actors, observing each other’s responses, interacting and sometimes
reassessing their own perceptions and understandings as a result
(Rayner, 1988; Petts et al., 2001; Murdock et al., 2003; Merkelsen,
2011; Busby and Onggo, 2012). As Pidgeon and Barnett (2013) argue, it
is important to understand how people interpret the information they
receive just as much as looking at the routes through which risk in-
formation is transmitted.
That said, SARF’s concept of ‘social stations of ampliﬁcation’ re-
cognises that individuals do act as members of larger social units and
may perceive risks through the values of the organisation or group to
which they belong (or from which they receive their communications),
together with any associated cultural biases (Kasperson, 2012; Dietz
and Stern,1996). Yet while SARF assigns experts a pivotal role as ‘social
stations of ampliﬁcation’, the processes (other than assumed procedural
and technical ones) through which the experts construct and justify
their risk judgements are not well explored, particularly when there is
insuﬃcient scientiﬁc evidence and when there may be divergent as-
sessments about the likely impacts and appropriate management re-
sponse. The question of how risk signals are assembled, deliberated on
and communicated by these actors over the course of a risk event thus
deserves further investigation.
In this paper our aim is to explore how ‘experts’ construct their
understanding of tree health risks, exempliﬁed through two invasive
tree pest and disease outbreaks in the UK, ash dieback (Hymenoscyphus
fraxineus) and oak processionary moth (Thaumetopoea processionea). We
consider the nature of uncertainty in each case and, following SARF, the
information sources drawn on by experts – deﬁned in this case as sci-
entists, policy makers, outbreak managers and key stakeholders – to
assess the risks and the cultural, psychological and institutional pro-
cesses, heuristics and social relations that shape their risk perceptions.
Following Busby and Duckett (2012), we analyse the way some experts
working in this area appear to make assumptions about, and have as-
signed particular risk attributions to, the policymakers whom they are
being called on to advise and the lay public whose behaviour is seen to
be driving some of the risk issues. We argue that these attributions are
an increasingly important part of the tree health risk narrative, with
potentially signiﬁcant consequences for the way in which a risk event is
anticipated, managed and communicated. Before presenting the ﬁnd-
ings from our empirical case studies, the following section outlines the
methods adopted.
2. Methods
The ﬁrst task was to undertake a documentary analysis to review
academic, policy and grey literature in order to outline the technical
risk assessment process in each outbreak, along with the policy and
management responses. An internet search was undertaken using key
terms such as ‘ash dieback’, ‘chalara’, ‘fraxineus’, ‘oak processionary
moth’ and ‘OPM’ to identify organisations and documents associated
with each outbreak. Further searches were undertaken on websites of
each identiﬁed organisation, collating material such as scientiﬁc re-
ports, government reports (e.g. PRAs) and policy documents, minutes
from meetings, industry and NGO publications, and House of
Commons/Lords debates. The documentary review was further ex-
plored, corroborated and critiqued through semi-structured interviews
(Creswell, 2013) with a range of experts for each outbreak between
March and November 2015. Questions sought to elicit respondents’ own
recollections of the outbreak and the focus of their risk concerns. We
sought to understand whether respondents felt their perceptions of the
risk had changed over time and the sources of information they drew on
to make their judgements about the risk, as well as their beliefs about
the risk concerns of other stakeholders and public.
Our sample was purposefully broad and we deﬁned ‘experts’ as the
scientists who made the initial judgements about risk in preparing a
PRA, policymakers who have to decide how and when to act, staﬀ of
public organisations who deal directly with managing outbreaks and a
wide array of key stakeholders (such as NGOs, the nursery sector and
foresters) with whom they interact. Our rationale for this sample was to
analyse how individuals across diﬀerent scales and foci of the outbreak
constructed their risk assessments. A long list of potential respondents
who ﬁtted the above criteria was identiﬁed as part of the documentary
analysis. The ﬁnal purposive sample of 37 individuals (ash dieback –
21; oak processionary moth (OPM) – 16) was selected through the
professional knowledge of the project team and its advisory committee,
along with snowball sampling where study respondents recommended
potential additional respondents from their own professional networks
(Montello and Sutton, 2013).
All interviews were conducted in person, lasting between 45 and
90 min, and were digitally recorded and transcribed verbatim. In line
with research ethics requirements, all respondents participated vo-
luntarily and have been anonymised throughout this paper, with re-
spondent codes assigned. The transcripts were analysed using a com-
bination of manual and digital coding (Nvivo 10.2 qualitative software)
in a process of thematic analysis within a social constructionist epis-
temology (Creswell, 2013; Braun and Clarke, 2006). In the spirit of
SARF, our analysis sought to identify the sources of information that
experts draw on, alongside the aﬀective and cognitive ﬁlters, heuristic
devices and interactions with others (including the pest/disease as well
as other social actors), which shape their perceptions.
In the following sections we present a narrative account of each
outbreak, outlining the technical risk assessment process and how this
is drawn on by decision-makers, alongside how arguments were made
and justiﬁed over time by utilising information from a diverse set of
sources to validate respondents’ perceptions of the risk.
3. Oak processionary moth
OPM is a native of southern Europe, but over recent decades its
range has expanded northwards, with populations now established in
north and west Europe (Groenen and Meurisse, 2012). The larvae of
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OPM can cause defoliation of oak trees, making them vulnerable to
attack by other pests and diseases and to environmental factors such as
drought. The caterpillars also present a threat to human and animal
health. They have tiny hairs containing a toxin that can cause itching
and irritation of the skin, eyes and respiratory system (Maier et al.,
2003; Mindlin et al., 2012).
The pest was ﬁrst discovered in the UK in 2006 on 20 newly planted
fastigiate oaks (Quercus robur ‘Fastigiata’) in the car park of a new
housing development in Richmond, West London. Shortly thereafter, a
further outbreak was identiﬁed in Ealing, also in West London, on a
stand of newly planted cypress oaks (Quercus robur ‘Fastigiata Koster’).
The source of the infestation was traced to an import of amenity cypress
oaks that had been grown in Italy and shipped to the UK from the
Netherlands in 2004 (Potter et al., 2014).
From the outset there was a lack of consensus over which govern-
ment agency should have overall responsibility for dealing with the
outbreak (Tomlinson et al., 2015). While the Forestry Commission (FC)
is responsible for the protection of forest trees and the Department for
Environment, Food and Rural Aﬀairs (Defra) has responsibility for
nursery trees and imported stock (Tomlinson et al., 2015), protection of
urban trees is a somewhat grey area (FC, 2011). The human health
dimension, the remit of the Health Protection Agency (HPA), added
further complexity to the already unclear regulatory framework. Dis-
cussions were held over the winter of 2006/2007 to decide which
agency would take statutory responsibility, with the FC eventually
taking the lead, and the HPA (now Public Health England) adopting a
supportive role. The rationale for this decision was that it might prove
diﬃcult to argue for OPM control under public health legislation, and
that more eﬀective legal powers were likely under the Plant Health Act
(1967). In any case, this delay in assigning regulatory responsibility
inevitably impacted on the speed of response to the outbreak and thus
the eﬀectiveness of attempts to eradicate the pest (Tomlinson et al.,
2015). Further, under the Plant Health (Forestry) Order 2005 the FC
issues Plant Health Statutory Notices (PHSNs) to enforce management
action on landowners or their agents, who are responsible for ensuring
OPM nests are removed. However, this approach has been criticised as
it depends on compliance from a large number of stakeholders and
diﬃculties arise when there are high levels of non-compliance (Potter
et al., 2014).
In line with standard practice when a new alien organism is de-
tected, a PRA was conducted by scientiﬁc experts on behalf of the
regulatory plant health authorities. According to the International Plant
Protection Convention’s standards for phytosanitary measures, PRAs
are designed to provide a systematic and objective assessment of the
risk to identify pests of quarantine concern (IPPC, 2004). Thus, as-
sembling the PRA involved identifying the likely pathways of in-
troduction, outlining possible future impacts and recommending ap-
propriate phytosanitary and management measures. Entomologists
were aware of the impacts of OPM prior to its arrival in the UK through
their academic and wider networks across Europe, outlining how OPM
had contributed to oak decline in Germany (Möller, 2006) and human
and animal health impacts in Belgium and the Netherlands (Gottschling
and Meyer, 2006). These observations were drawn on in the PRA to
conclude that OPM was likely to become established in the UK, al-
though it was uncertain to what extent it might spread from the initial
outbreak in West London. The PRA further concluded that there was a
high degree of certainty that the most likely pathway for OPM entry
into the UK was via ‘plants for planting’, especially the importation of
semi-mature trees for ‘instant’ landscapes (Evans, 2007). The economic
impact of OPM was considered high in terms of losses due to a decline
in timber quality, but also potential tourism losses if the pest reduced
the amenity value of oak-rich publicly accessible forests. In addition,
the economic cost of controlling the pest because of human and animal
health risks was also assessed as signiﬁcant.
While the process of undertaking a PRA is intended to provide an
objective assessment of the risks associated with a potential new pest,
the scientists working on them also indicated to us the need to be
pragmatic in their recommendations, keeping in mind the particula-
rities of the EU plant health regime and international trade agreements
under the World Trade Organisation Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS)
Measures. These politico-economic factors contributed to the way ex-
perts and decision makers in our study framed the risk of OPM.
However, as one scientist (R1) engaged in producing risk assessments
asserted, even at the regulatory level in Europe, it was not clear-cut
whether OPM should be framed as a tree or human health risk. Some
member states (e.g. the Netherlands) considered OPM to be mainly a
public health pest, while others saw it as predominantly a forest pest
(e.g. Germany), depending on whether OPM was mainly impacting
urban or forest trees. Explaining how any actions sanctioned under the
British Plant Health Act (1967) need to be justiﬁed in the PRA, this
respondent reﬂected: “We had to be very careful in the pest risk analysis
that we kept the emphasis on the defoliation and issues of tree health,
and only mention in passing, if you like, that it was also an issue with
urticating hairs” (R1).
Thus, the OPM outbreak is characterised by high levels of certainty
about its main entry pathway (plants for planting), but contestations
over whether the pest should be considered primarily a tree health risk
or a human/animal health risk. Responses in our study reﬂected this
disagreement in risk perceptions. Perspectives ranged from considering
OPM as a signiﬁcant risk to a low risk, in relation to other threats. Five
respondents were very concerned about OPM, feeling that it presents a
signiﬁcant risk to human, animal and tree health. Two managers of
urban green spaces were further concerned about the potential impacts
on the recreational use of open spaces, with one explaining: “If we’re
going to end up with people saying, ‘actually I’m going to be resistant to
going into these areas’, then that is appalling and tragic … woodland is
a very important part of our natural environment and somewhere
people need to be able to go and enjoy” (R2). A natural environment
manager, however, disagreed, suggesting that “it won’t actually have a
massive impact on how people use woods; it’s just another factor that
people factor in when they go for a walk; they’re just aware of it, and
it’s not going to stop people going out” (R3).
Two respondents, both health professionals, who felt that OPM has
a low human health risk supported their position by suggesting that
there is no evidence to suggest otherwise (e.g. no deaths, no anaphy-
laxis). This is reinforced by a Public Health England (PHE) systematic
review of European literature, which concluded that OPM is a low risk
to human health (O’Connell et al., 2015). In terms of PHE’s risk per-
ceptions, a policy maker (P5) put this into context by indicating the
need to balance the risks of OPM with other diseases: “We deal with
meningitis and tuberculosis, where death and serious illness and sig-
niﬁcant public health… In our context it is a low public health risk.
Rashes can be dealt with.”
Other respondents indicated that the current human and animal
health risk from OPM is low because the pest is being actively managed.
As a local authority manager (R4) commented: “If we’re not managing
it, I can’t see how there wouldn’t be a massive outcry.” For others, such
as environmental NGOs, attention coalesced around the potential im-
pacts of the control methods (especially pesticides) used to treat OPM,
rather than OPM itself. These responses echoed those outlined in a
Butterﬂy Conservation report (BC, 2013), which expressed concerns
over the eﬀectiveness of prophylactic spraying, especially aerial
spraying of woodland, and included concerns about the collateral da-
mage on other species and the human health risks associated with the
use of biopesticides.
Further, there was little consensus around whether OPM presents a
signiﬁcant risk to tree health. One outbreak manager (R5) said: “I think
it’s a real challenge to suggest that oak trees will be severely, sig-
niﬁcantly aﬀected by OPM. Individual trees, yes, I can see that. But
population dynamics of any species is not going to want to destroy its
habitat, so they go through peaks and troughs.”
Our analysis of the OPM case suggests that, rather than
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demonstrating an objective assessment of the risks, the institutional
aﬃliation of respondents appeared to be a factor inﬂuencing how OPM
and its attendant risks are framed. Unsurprisingly, those responsible for
managing public spaces were most concerned about the risks to public
health, while environmental organisations headlined the biodiversity
impacts of the pesticides used to control the pest. For respondents who
felt that OPM was a serious risk, anecdotal evidence was often drawn on
to support their concerns. Reference was made, for instance, to cases of
anaphylactic shock or the death of animals that they had heard about
from Europe.
OPM is a pest that has the potential to aﬀect people in terms of both
direct health impacts and in limiting recreational use of the countryside
and green spaces. Hence, respondents were surprised that OPM had not
attracted more media attention, with only occasional news stories.
Nevertheless, an outbreak manager expressed concern at some of the
OPM media coverage though and worried that: “The news media put
their own ﬁlter on the story which often comes out in the headlines like
killer caterpillars … there are journalists out there who’ll use it as an
anti-government, sort of, message or story. You know, the government’s
fouled up again” (R6).
Following from this, reputational risk concerns were widely ex-
pressed. Many of the interviewed policymakers and risk managers were
concerned about needing to be seen by wider publics and stakeholders
as dealing with the outbreak appropriately and to “be seen to act rea-
sonably” (R5). This suggests that, alongside dealing with the ‘real’ risk
of the pest itself, risk managers also had to manage public (and other
stakeholders) ‘perceived’ risk. As one of our respondents put it: “So
there’s the actual, what is happening, in a true scientiﬁc view, but ac-
tually what is happening in people’s perceptions. And those are often
quite far apart. And you somehow have to balance what’s the real risk,
with actually what’s the perceived risk. And it’s managing that per-
ceived risk, which I think is often diﬃcult” (R5). This ﬁnding reﬂects
Leiss’s (2003) observation that, in SARF terms, the ‘risk event’ (the
objective characteristics of the hazard) and ‘the social construction of
risk’ (concern about the hazard) present themselves to risk managers at
the same time and must be attended to concurrently.
As our analysis has demonstrated, experts in the OPM case drew on
a wide range of information sources besides oﬃcial risk assessments to
construct their understanding of the risk associated with the pest. This
included personal experience of dealing with the outbreak, with one
respondent reporting becoming sensitised to the caterpillars through
direct exposure. Alongside oﬃcial notiﬁcations about the pest, re-
spondents used anecdotal evidence, particularly from outbreaks in
other countries, to explain their perceptions of the risk. Institutional
ﬁlters clearly had a role to play in shaping what respondents felt was ‘at
risk’ and attributions were made about other stakeholders’ concerns.
For risk managers, a need to protect the public from harm and to act
responsibly in dealing with the outbreak inﬂuenced their perceptions of
the risk and the resulting management strategies.
4. Ash dieback
Ash dieback is a fungal disease of ash trees caused by
Hymenoscyphus fraxineus. It can infect many diﬀerent species of ash, but
the Common ash (Fraxinus excelsior) and Narrow-leaved ash (Fraxinus
angustifolia) are the most severely aﬀected, especially young trees
(Kowalski, 2006; FR, 2012). The disease causes leaf loss, dieback of the
crown and bark lesions. Infection with ash dieback is usually fatal, ei-
ther directly or by weakening the tree, making it vulnerable to attack by
other pests and pathogens. Natural spread is by wind-blown spores from
the fruiting bodies (Queloz et al., 2011) that can result in the disease
spreading up to 20–30 km per year (Solheim et al., 2011). In addition,
the pathogen can be spread longer distances when infected plants are
transported via trade pathways or when infected leaf litter is moved
from an infected to an uninfected site. The ﬁrst cases of ash dieback in
Europe are believed to have originated in Poland, with infected trees
reported in 1992 (Kowalski, 2006). Ash dieback is now widespread
across Europe and in 2007 it was added to the European and Medi-
terranean Plant Protection Organization (EPPO) Alert List.
Ash dieback was ﬁrst identiﬁed in the UK in February 2012 at a
nursery in Buckinghamshire in a consignment of 600 trees from the
Netherlands. Later that year it was conﬁrmed in further nursery sites
and in the wider environment. The government’s response was to issue
a Plant Health Order (FC, 2012) on 29 October 2012, placing restric-
tions on importing ash trees into Britain and the emergency COBR(A)
committee met to discuss how to deal with the spread of ash dieback. As
a result, a rapid national survey of ash woodlands was undertaken over
the following weekend and initial actions to tackle the threat were
announced, which included tracing and destroying infected trees in
nurseries and newly-planted sites (DEFRA, 2012). Scientiﬁc research
was commissioned to improve understanding of the disease and identify
tolerant variants, as well as the establishment of a Tree Health and
Plant Biosecurity Expert Taskforce which aimed to assess the current
disease threats to tree health more widely. While ash dieback is most
severe in South East England and East Anglia, it has been identiﬁed
across the UK and it is anticipated that it will kill a large number of ash
trees in the coming decades. Current management involves eﬀorts to
slow the spread and scientiﬁc research to identify genetic variants that
are tolerant to the disease (DEFRA, 2013).
Respondents in our study referenced the early scientiﬁc un-
certainties concerning the identity and nature of the pathogen re-
sponsible for ash dieback. This, it has since been accepted, hindered
early regulatory action to protect the UK from infection (Woodward and
Boa, 2013). The fungus was ﬁrst described in 2006 as Chalara fraxinea
by Kowalski (2006). However, subsequent genetic and morphological
research indicated that Chalara fraxinea is the asexual (anamorph) stage
of the ascomycete fungus Hymenoscyphus albidus, known in Europe
(including the UK) since 1851 and not considered pathogenic (Kowalski
and Holdenrieder, 2009; Kraj et al., 2012). Thus, as one of the inter-
viewed scientists explained: “We felt that as the organism was here and
it was not doing any damage, as far as we could tell, to ash trees, and we
thought it was widespread, then it couldn't be classiﬁed as a quarantine
pest, and so we couldn’t put any statutory controls on it” (R7). By the
time the biological identiﬁcation of the pathogenic teleomorph was
conﬁrmed (Queloz et al., 2011), it was likely that the organism had
already been present in the UK for several years prior to its discovery in
2012.
A PRA published in 2013 identiﬁed four main pathways of entry for
ash dieback into the UK: plants for planting, wood, seeds and con-
taminated soil as a commodity or with host or non-host plants, with the
importation of infected plants the likely main route of entry (Sansford,
2013). Estimates suggested that around half a million ash saplings were
being imported every year (HCDEB, 2012). The PRA further acknowl-
edged that natural spread through windblown spores from continental
Europe was also being considered as a potential route of entry, citing
modelling work undertaken by the University of Cambridge (DEFRA,
2013; Wentworth, 2012 Wentworth, 2012). An outbreak manager in
our study supported this hypothesis: “[The fact that] the disease was
present down the east coast meant that, without making a scientiﬁc
statement of how it had got there, it was pretty obvious it was blowing
in…. And people were saying it can’t cross the Channel… But it was all
up the east coast. So how else did it get there then other than by natural
means?” (R8). In contrast, a scientist respondent cited research by
European plant pathologists (Chandelier et al., 2014) that concludes
that long distance dispersal by air currents is unlikely: “The ascospores
of ash dieback are very thin-walled and they're likely to desiccate fairly
quickly after release…. the dispersal distance for the majority of as-
cospores of ash dieback is fairly short – we're talking about metres as
opposed to kilometres” (R7).
Identifying the mode of entry of the pathogen into the UK was
clearly a politically sensitive issue, not least in the context of growing
media interest in ash dieback in 2012 which criticised the government
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for lax biosecurity and a failure to ban the import of ash early enough
(Fellenor et al., under review; Heuch, 2014). For policy makers, pre-
existing sensitivities to tree issues in the wake of the Government’s
aborted attempt to sell oﬀ England’s public forest estate in 2010 may
mean they were already sensitised to critical media coverage of a risk
controversy associated with trees. As an outbreak manager (R8) ex-
plained to us: “In my view, the main driver was the media, and then the
government response to the media.” Ash dieback was seen by politi-
cians as a ‘national crisis’ (HOC, 2012), and an outbreak manager (R8)
indicated that there was “strong pressure right from the very top for the
government to be seen to be doing something about this.”
A representative of a forest industry body agreed that the
Government response was partly inﬂuenced by a perceived public re-
sponse, alongside lobbying from the environmental sector. In this re-
gard, an industry representative described how the organisation, along
with other NGOs, saw the ash dieback outbreak as an opportunity to
raise tree health on the political agenda: “So we started getting some
phone calls from the press about it and we very quickly decided that
this was an opportunity for us to raise the whole proﬁle of tree health
within government circles. So we were very happy to brief the press and
make it as big a story as possible, and as threatening” (R10).
The ash dieback case highlights some of the issues and contestations
around the science-policy interface and how science and a risk case are
used to inform policy or to justify policy decisions. Clearly, ash dieback
had become a political issue with the government response reﬂecting
what Hood (2007) calls a ‘negativity bias’, where risk managers pay
more attention to negative rather than positive reactions in an eﬀort to
avoid blame and maintain reputation. Early uncertainty about the
identity of the ash dieback pathogen meant that it was diﬃcult to
regulate for under European law, especially for an organism that had
already been introduced into the Eurozone. One scientist spoke about
the diﬃculty of giving advice to regulators when there was no scientiﬁc
certainty about the identity of the fungus (R11). Several others, how-
ever, suggested that perhaps a precautionary approach should have
been adopted meanwhile when it was recognised that a new pathogen
was spreading across Europe.
Those dealing with the outbreak on the ground described how, early
in the outbreak, at a stage when there was little unambiguous scientiﬁc
evidence, they drew on a range of sources to make their risk judge-
ments. For instance, a local authority representative (R12) indicated
ﬁrst hearing about ash dieback in the media, and that the level of news
coverage made them think it was a serious issue. This led them to ex-
amine trees in the local area, where evidence of mature trees dying
quickly did not seem to align with oﬃcial assessments that older trees
would probably survive for many years. The respondent was concerned
that “an awful lot of misnomers are passed on from one paper to an-
other, and actually you have to see the thing in the ﬁeld… we had to
learn the lessons ourselves.” Alongside personal observation, another
respondent tried to make sense of the ash dieback outbreak by refer-
encing previous outbreaks: “I was working around in the area, and I was
looking at ash trees, and I thought, with the media coverage, I thought,
actually this is really serious, this could be another Dutch elm disease”
(R13). Another (R12) referenced an outbreak of Asian longhorn beetle
(Anoplophora glabripennis) earlier that same year. This benchmarking of
new risks against previous outbreaks, together with reference to the
widespread loss of ash in Denmark and the media coverage, led to a
consensus from our respondents that ash dieback could have a sig-
niﬁcant impact on British ash populations.
Echoing the reputational concerns reported above for OPM, some
respondents felt that the nature and speed of the Government’s response
to ash dieback could partly be explained by the need for oﬃcials to
safeguard reputation by responding quickly to what was perceived to be
acute public concern over ash dieback. Following Blok et al.’s (2008)
contention that experts often attribute public anxiety to people’s emo-
tional fears, several respondents in our study argued that public con-
cern around ash dieback can be explained in subjective and emotional
terms, with ash considered highly valued by UK publics as an important
part of Britain’s natural cultural heritage. An outbreak manager (R6),
for instance, suggested that dieback hit the headlines in the way it did
“because it was Dutch elm disease all over again … I think it was really
the emotional tug of losing another much loved aspect of the coun-
tryside and landscape.” Another respondent (R7) suggested that,
alongside Dutch elm disease, the public perceived a failure by gov-
ernment to deal with other biosecurity risks, such as foot and mouth
disease. A local authority respondent used migration as a heuristic
device to further attribute public concern: “I think it really linked into
this whole issue around migration and immigration and so on. I think it
linked to a feeling that this was something that was imported, and is
then killing our British tree stock.”
In summary, as with OPM, respondents utilised a range of in-
formation sources to construct their understanding of the risks posed by
ash dieback. Beyond oﬃcial risk assessments, respondents drew on
what they perceived as public concern and the Government’s response
to that public attention in the wake of a period of intense media at-
tention when the outbreak was ﬁrst identiﬁed. There was referral to
past risk events and evidence of sensitivity towards maintaining re-
putation as scientists and policymakers attempted to deal both with, in
SARF terms, the ‘risk event’ itself, alongside ‘the social construction of
the risk’.
5. Conclusions
The two tree health case studies presented in this paper illustrate
the extent to which expert risk perceptions are inﬂuenced by a range of
socio-political, aﬀective and cultural ﬁlters. We have identiﬁed the si-
tuated and socially-constructed nature of those risk perceptions through
the roles played by such actors and have identiﬁed the ways in which
risk judgements are constructed over time through a process of drawing
on diverse information sources, social and cultural backgrounds and
heuristic devices. In many instances, respondents indicated high levels
of concern in the early stages of outbreaks when there was limited
scientiﬁc evidence, a lack of clarity on management responsibilities or
regulatory mechanisms.
The issue of uncertainty poses one of the greatest challenges facing
experts in framing objective risk assessments for both current and fu-
ture tree health outbreaks. For many tree pests and diseases, there is
uncertainty about the likelihood of introduction and spread but also
about the eﬀectiveness of any attempts to control, manage or contain an
outbreak once it is underway (Potter and Urquhart, 2017; Brasier,
2008). Furthermore, scientiﬁc understanding is often assembled in-
crementally as outbreaks unfold, making eﬀective management and
control very diﬃcult to plan, justify and implement. Our case study
outbreaks present diﬀerent risk proﬁles, with OPM displaying a range
of expert representations of the risk, many of which are shaped by in-
stitutional aﬃliation and the need to deal with the pest in order to
safeguard public health. The nature and tenor of the response to ash
dieback emerges as similarly complex, with risk managers having to
assemble the risk case to justify action in the face of an incomplete and
contested scientiﬁc evidence base. For policy makers and risk managers
much of the early risk management in relation to ash dieback focused
on dealing with the reputational risks at stake given an intense public
and media scrutiny during the initial stages of the outbreak in 2012.
As with other risk controversies, those managing tree pests and
diseases must manage not only risks to tree health (and in the case of
OPM, human and animal health), but also be sensitive to the way
publics might assess risk managers’ subsequent response (Ramsey,
2008; Leiss, 2003). Under conditions of uncertainty, policymakers and
decision-makers may feel particularly exposed to risks to their reputa-
tion, partly due to the need to make and justify decisions early in
outbreaks that may impose signiﬁcant costs on a range of stakeholders
and publics. Both scientists and outbreak managers dealing with pests
and diseases described how they piece together information and
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evidence over time to build up a picture of the risk, through annual
surveying and gathering data and observing the epidemiology and po-
pulation dynamics of the organism (see Table A1). However, in addition
to technical assessments of risk, such as PRAs, they need to assemble
risk judgements from many diﬀerent sources and in doing so may also
attribute risk perceptions to other stakeholders and wider publics. De-
cision makers, therefore, may look to the media as a proxy for public
concern but, as a number of our respondents recognised, while the
media may help to inform the public and raise (a degree of) awareness,
this does not necessarily equate to public concern.
Our analysis suggests that where there are concerns over un-
certainty and reputational risk, decision makers are likely to be sensi-
tive to what they believe the public is thinking. In the absence of reli-
able empirical evidence about public risk perceptions, they may
therefore attribute risk perceptions to wider publics and other stake-
holders. This observation suggests that the SARF needs to more fully
recognise both the socially constructed nature of expert risk perceptions
and to reconsider casting the role of the public as ‘ampliﬁers’ of risk.
How experts attribute public concern about hazard events can either
intensify or attenuate the perceptions of those charged with managing
outbreaks or those blamed for new pest or disease incursions.
By opening the black box of how experts judge risk, our analysis
suggests a need for recognition within SARF of the socially constructed
nature of expert risk judgment and a reconsideration of expert assess-
ments as the benchmark around which public perceptions are ampli-
ﬁed. In the tree health case, we have shown expert risk perceptions to
be heterogeneous and dynamic, drawing on a wide range of ‘evidence’,
especially when there are high levels of scientiﬁc uncertainty.
Institutions managing and regulating for outbreaks may, therefore, re-
spond both to the hazard event itself but also to what they attribute as
public concern in their eﬀorts to ensure the social acceptability of any
interventions.
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